A Real-World, Hybrid Event Sequence Generation Framework for Android Apps by Sun, Jun
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Computer Science and Engineering: Theses, 
Dissertations, and Student Research 
Computer Science and Engineering, Department 
of 
Summer 8-2021 
A Real-World, Hybrid Event Sequence Generation Framework for 
Android Apps 
Jun Sun 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, jun.sun@huskers.unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/computerscidiss 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, and the Computer Sciences Commons 
Sun, Jun, "A Real-World, Hybrid Event Sequence Generation Framework for Android Apps" (2021). 
Computer Science and Engineering: Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research. 210. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/computerscidiss/210 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science and Engineering, Department of at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Computer Science and 
Engineering: Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 





Presented to the Faculty of
The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska
In Partial Fulfilment of Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Science
Major: Computer Science
Under the Supervision of Professors Witawas Srisa-an and Hamid Bagheri
Lincoln, Nebraska
August, 2021
A REAL-WORLD, HYBRID EVENT SEQUENCE GENERATION FRAMEWORK FOR
ANDROID APPS
Jun Sun, M.S.
University of Nebraska, 2021
Adviser: Witawas Srisa-an and Hamid Bagheri
Generating meaningful inputs for Android apps is still a challenging issue that needs more
research. Past research efforts have shown that random test generation is still an effective
means to exercise User-Interface (UI) events to achieve high code coverage. At the same time,
heuristic search approaches can effectively reach specified code targets. Our investigation
shows that these approaches alone are insufficient to generate inputs that can exercise specific
code locations in complex Android applications.
This thesis introduces a hybrid approach that combines two different input generation
techniques–heuristic search based on genetic algorithm and random instigation of UI events, to
reach targets hidden deep in a code-base. We apply our approach to conduct dynamic analysis
to verify the static analysis results produced by GAINDroid, a platform incompatibility
detection for Android. Our result indicates that the hybrid approach can generate inputs




I want to express my appreciation for those who have been supporting my academic pursuit.
Without these people, I would not complete this work and graduate with my M.S. degree.
I want to thank my family for providing this fantastic opportunity to pursue a graduate
degree. I have learned a lot at UNL, not just academic knowledge but also made new friends.
I also want to thank my academic advisors, Professor Witty Srisa-an and Dr. Hamid
Bagheri for their support. Professor Hamid sparked the idea for this work when I was taking
his class. Professor Witty is a nice gentleman, and I have worked with him since I was an
undergraduate student. We worked together and solved many unpredictable challenges in
this research work. It has been a pleasure to work on this project. My gratitude to them will
never fade.
Last but not least, I appreciate University of Nebraska - Lincoln for giving me a
unique environment to learn and socialize. As an alumnus, I look forward to seeing the next
generation of UNL students enjoying the same experience as I did.
iv
Table of Contents
List of Figures vi
List of Tables vii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Related Work 5
2.1 GAINDroid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 PREV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Other Test Input Generation Tools for Android . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3 Approach 11
3.1 Target generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Sensitive path generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3 Test case generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.4 Dynamic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4 Empirical Evaluation 19
4.1 Objects of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2 Independent Variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3 Dependent Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
v
4.4 Study Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.5 Threats to Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5 Results 24
5.1 RQ1: Effectiveness of Entry Point Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2 RQ2: Effectiveness of Sensitive Path Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.3 RQ3: Effectiveness of Generated Inputs to Reach Targets . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6 Conclusion 31




3.1 The Proposed System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 A Method Call Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1 Number of Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2 Monkey Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.3 PREV Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.4 Hybrid Result (PREV and Monkey) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
vii
List of Tables
4.1 App information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.1 Entry Points after Applying Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2 Path Reduction after Applying Algorithm 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26




With the ever-increasing demand for mobile software over the last decade, the increasing
complexity of programs is unavoidable. To better analyze the quality of the entire codebase,
software engineers have developed many approaches, such as static analyses and dynamic
analyses, to ensure the dependability and security of their applications. For static analysis,
the codebase of an application is analyzed without executing it. For dynamic analysis, the
program is performed so that engineers can observe its runtime behaviors. In terms of usage,
researchers and practitioners widely used both types of analyses. As an example, Google uses
both static and dynamic analyses to vet apps for security vulnerabilities before accepting
them to the Play Store [10, 11,21,25].
While software engineers can deploy static analysis techniques without running an applica-
tion, the analysis result can contain many false positives. As such, these engineers verify the
static analysis results by applying dynamic analyses afterward. Dynamic analysis is used to
observe if a reported fault or vulnerability is genuine. The approach of combining static and
dynamic analyses is called hybrid analysis. In theory, hybrid analysis can yield more precise
results. However, in practice, developing adequate test inputs that can reach any arbitrary
code target (e.g., a code location that static analysis reports as containing a dependability or
security issue) is still a challenging process, especially in mobile applications such as those
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running on Android devices. As such, there are several recent research efforts to improve the
effectiveness of test input generation for Android apps (e.g., [8, 20,23,29,34]).
Two significant issues complicate the test input generation process for Android apps. First,
most Android apps tend to utilize Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs) extensively. Generating
inputs or event sequences (e.g., clicks, scrolls, or text inputs that mimics user interactions)
that can reach a particular target often requires a laborious process of creating the GUI
models or extensive analysis to understand each GUI page and then "rip" these pages to
guide the event sequence generation process [2]. Second, Android apps are component-based,
so invoking a component from another component requires “intents” and service inputs (not
GUI-based) to exercise specific system events. A survey by Choudhary et al. classified the
approaches to generate test inputs for Android into three categories: random, model-based,
and systematic. They also reported that 11 out of 14 tools focus on UI-event generation,
with only two capable of generating system inputs. Their evaluation result also indicated
that Monkey, a widely used random event sequence generation tool, provides the greatest
code coverage [8].
Demissie et al. recently introduced PREV, a security analysis approach to detect
permission re-delegation vulnerabilities in Android apps. As part of this framework, they
introduced an intent generation technique based on a meta-heuristic search using a genetic
algorithm. This component initiates dynamic analysis to verify the static analysis results.
Their evaluation results indicated that their test input generation process effectively reaches
most targets specified by static analysis as containing permission re-delegation instances [9].
Recently, our research group introduced GAINDroid, a static analysis approach to detect
incompatibility issues between an Android app and its underlying Android platform [27]. Due
to frequent changes in the Android framework to add new features and improve performance
and security, existing and new apps may not offer proper support to either previous or
most recent Android frameworks. Such incompatibility issues can lead to runtime crashes.
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GAINDroid is an automated approach that quickly identifies if an app may crash due to
incompatibility issues. Our evaluation of GAINDroid indicates that it is more effective than
the state-of-the-art tools as it can detect more types and instances of API incompatibilities.
However, similar to any typical static analysis approach, it can also produce many false
positives. As such, to make GAINDroid more useful, we need to improve its precision
through dynamic analysis.
1.1 Contributions
In this M.S. theses, we introduce a new test input generation process that combines the search-
based input generation approach in PREV with the random UI-event sequence generation
approach of Monkey. As part of this approach, we develop two static analysis approaches
to identify relevant paths that have a high likelihood of reaching a specific target identified
by GAINDroid. We then utilize our proposed system to verify the results generated by
GAINDroid.
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
1. Introducing a new hybrid test case generation approach based on genetic algorithm and
random UI-event generation.
2. Develop a static analysis technique to identify paths that can be reachable from selected
public entry points.
3. Develop a static analysis technique to further identify suitable paths for our proposed
approach to explore.
4. Use our proposed approach to verify the result of GAINDroid.
We organized the rest of this paper as follows. Chapter 2 provides the background
information and describes each approach, GAINDroid, Monkey, and PREV. Chapter 3
4
provides technical detail and explains how our approach works. Chapter 4 describes our
experimental setup and design. Chapter 5 summarizes the experimental result. We provide




In this chapter, we describe relevant techniques including GAINDroid, Prev, and existing
test input generation techniques for Android.
2.1 GAINDroid
GAINDroid is a new approach to detect all types of API - and permission-induced mismatches
automatically. GAINDroid is built on top of Jitana, a virtual class-loader based program
analysis framework [30]. Unlike existing approaches that analyze the entire codebase of the
application or the Android framework, the key advantage of Jitana is its ability to load
application and framework components a single class at a time. This incremental loading
means that GAINDroid only analyzes reachable components within the application code
and the framework code, resulting in significant savings in both analysis time and memory
usage. In addition, by analyzing the actual framework code, GAINDroid has the potential
to detect issues that may lie deep inside the framework codebase.
Compared with existing state-of-the-art incompatibility detection techniques, GAIN-
Droid provides several advantages. First, GAINDroid holistically analyzes the application
and application development framework by loading the necessary classes. Second, GAIN-
Droid is a scalable approach that incrementally loads and analyzes API levels, making it
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faster and more scalable than existing techniques. Third, GAINDroid can analyze all codes
in the utilized APIs in an application development framework rather than focus on specific
APIs as in prior approaches. Finally, the result shows that GAINDroid can detect up to
76% more instances of compatibility issues than state-of-the-art methods.
2.2 PREV
PREV is an automated framework for detecting permission re-delegation vulnerabilities
by combining static analysis, natural language processing, machine learning, and genetic
algorithm [9]. The approach consists of three main steps. First, it generates permission
re-delegation models based on a large training set of safe apps. Second, it performs outlier
detection. It clusters applications under test based on the developed models and a classification
technique. It then conducts API reachability analysis to detect if the app can access privileged
APIs. If it cannot, the app is safe. If the app is vulnerable, it goes through the classification
process to identify the vulnerabilities.
The third step, test case generation, is most relevant to us. It presents the input generation
process as an optimization problem where the goal is to expose specific program behaviors by
reaching specific code targets. They used a genetic algorithm, a meta-heuristics approach
to perform optimization [14]. Their approach searches for an optimal input by evolving
initially random inputs through generations. As a solution approaches the final solution, its
chromosomes have a higher probability of transmitting to the subsequent generations. The
main idea is to combine fit solutions to generate a fitter one. This process continues until it
finds the optimal input or it times out. In this case, an optimal input is an intent that can
exercise a path in an application to reach a specified target. Each relevant path starts at an
entry point and ends at the call to anomalous privileged API. The runtime behaviors can
verify if the app is indeed vulnerable.
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In their evaluation, they conclude that the proposed input generation system is effective
as it can generate inputs that can reach most of their specified targets; i.e., code locations
vulnerable to permission re-delegation Using 1,258 safe apps from Play Store, they found 30
apps to be vulnerable. They then applied their dynamic analysis based on the proposed test
input generation and found no false alarms [9].
2.3 Other Test Input Generation Tools for Android
Monkey is the most widely used testing method, a black-box style testing, and it is
included in the Android developer toolkit where users do not need any additional installation.
Monkey only generates UI events by implementing the random strategy, but the user must
define the number of events that Monkey can produce. Monkey stops as this upper limit
is met. UI Automator is another black-box style testing, including a set of APIs for
creating UI experiments between users and device applications, such as launching an app
or clicking buttons. Once users aimed the UI components, such as UiObject, UiScrollable,
UI Automator tests apps based on the targeting UI components. In our work, we use
Monkey since it has shown to be effective in achieving high code coverage.
ACTEve [3] is a GUI testing framework that uses concolic execution instead of GUI
models to determine low-level parameters of GUI events such as the coordinates of tapping
events. Symbolic execution is also used to check whether an event’s impact of program
state is relevant (read-only or writes) and prune out event sequences that end in irrelevant
events. ACTEve can only generate event sequences with no more than four lengths in
terms of performance, making it less practical in testing modern mobile applications. Ganov
et al. [12] use symbolic execution to generate an abstraction of the GUI interactions and
then generate concrete widget parameters to test Java SWT applications. AppIntent [35]
performs symbolic execution selectively on a certain set of event handlers to expose data
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leakage. ConDroid [26] uses symbolic execution and instrumentation to overwrite register
values during runtime to inspect specific program behaviors. JPF-Android [31] , [32] and
SymDroid [16] are symbolic execution engines specifically designed for Android system.
IntelliDroid [34] generates targeted event sequences by solving method constraints on the
call graph path from the entry point to the target method.
Collider [15] is an Android input generation tool that uses concolic execution and a
GUI model to generate event sequences for user-specified targets. Given a specific program
code target, Collider uses symbolic execution to identify a series of anchor events that
are required to satisfy the path constraints of target code execution path, then uses an
existing GUI model to generate event sequences that connect the anchor events from the app
entry to the final event. The generated event sequences are then validated on a test device.
At the same time, Collider is capable of generating complex event sequences for specific
hard-to-reach targets. It has the limitation of requiring an existing and sound GUI model,
which is not a trivial task especially considering that Collider targets applications that
have complex GUI structures and control flows.
Sig-Droid [22] is an input generation framework that uses static analysis to create two
models of an application: behavior, which exposes implicit calls among event handlers, and
interface, which abstracts the GUI. Based on the two models, Sig-Droid performs symbolic
execution on the event handler call graphs and then generates event sequences based on
the Interface Model. TrimDroid [24] also uses static analysis to develop two models: the
interface model and the activity transition model. TrimDroid generates event sequences
based on extracting GUI-induced dependencies using control-flow and data-flow analysis.
Model-based testing is also a commonly used testing approach that relies on GUI models
to generate test cases. MobiGuitar [2] is a dynamic GUI testing tool that builds a model
of the GUI by a depth-first exploration strategy. PUMA [13] is a programmable GUI testing
framework that allows users to define specific actions for available events during the exploration.
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Mahmood et al. [18] propose a cloud-based testing framework that generates test cases from
an application model and executes them on multiple emulators simultaneously. A3E [6] is
an input generation tool that can explore the GUI using a depth-first exploration strategy
and a more systematic targeted exploration. Both exploration strategies of A3E are based
on a statically generated GUI model using taint analysis. DroidBox [17] is a lightweight
GUI-model-based input generation tool that can generate a GUI model without requiring
source code or instrumentation. Comparing to our proposed work, a typical limitation of
these model-based testing frameworks is their inability to generate event sequences that can
trigger specific program behaviors beneath the GUI surface. In terms of comparison among
different testing techniques, a study [1] proposed a unique platform that defines the testing
strategy and evaluates the effectiveness and cost comparisons among existing testing tools.
In addition, various analysis techniques have been introduced to improve the performance
of input generation. SwiftHand [7] uses machine learning to learn the model of an application
during GUI exploration, while EvoDroid [19] performs evolutionary testing on Android
apps. The idea is similar to PREV but the tool is much older. Thus, we choose PREV as
our baseline system.
EHBDroid [28] is a unique GUI testing approach that directly invokes the event
handler methods through instrumentation instead of the traditional GUI-based technique.
Sapienz [20] is a search-based testing approach that also uses genetic algorithms and string
seeding to generate event sequences. Stoat [29] generates event sequences using Gibbs
sampling that favors events that have a higher probability of extending code coverage.
In comparison among different testing techniques, a recent study [8] proposed a unique
platform that defines the testing strategy and evaluates the effectiveness and cost comparisons
among existing test input generation tools for Android. The result of their study indicated
that Monkey is most effective at delivering good code coverage. PREV has also shown to
be effective in generating inputs that can reach specific targets. As such, our approach to
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creating inputs to verify the results from GAINDroid consists of PREV input generator
and Monkey. Next, we describe our approach to selecting paths to exercises and combining




This chapter discusses the overall architecture of GAINDroid and, specifically, the detailed
implementation of our input generation and dynamic analysis system. Figure 3.1 illustrates
the overall hybrid analysis system architecture that includes applications under analysis
(AUA), GAINDroid, test input generator, and Genymotion, an Android device emulator.
Because the focus of this thesis is to create an input generation system to verify the result of
GAINDroid, the main focus of this chapter is on the input generation process and execution
of apps using those generated inputs.
There are three steps in the test input generation process: target generation, sensitive
path generation, and test case generation. Once our proposed system generates the inputs,
they are used to exercise AUAs as part of dynamic analysis. Next, we describe these steps in
turn.
3.1 Target generation
This step represents the transition from static analysis to dynamic analysis. GAINDroid
performs static analysis and generates the results in this step. Essentially, the output of
GAINDroid contains information on whether an app is vulnerable to platform incompatibility
issues and where those potential issues lie. As the first step, GAINDroid takes a set of
12






















































Figure 3.2: A Method Call Graph
decompiled APK files as input, and it returns the analysis results. Apps with targets are
vulnerable; apps without any target are safe.
Note that a target is presented by GAINDroid in a form of Class:Method pair: an-
droid/app/backup/BackupAgentHelper;.onRestore(...ILandroid/os/ParcelFileDescriptor;). In
this example, the method onRestore(), which is part of BackupAgentHelper class, is a vul-
nerable target node because GAINDroid identifies that a call to this method can cause a
run-time crash due to incompatibility issues.
For an app that GAINDroid reports as vulnerable, each target is used in the next step
as a starting point to identify sensitive paths. We describe this process next.
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3.2 Sensitive path generation
We built GAINDroid on top of Jitana, a program analysis framework for Android apps.
As such, the result of its analysis is a complete method call graph for each app. Figure 3.2
illustrates an example of a method call graph. Each node in a method call graph represents
a method, and each edge indicates the invoking relationship between two methods. An entry
point is the origin of a path. In Figure 3.2, the entry points are methods access$600 and
publishProgress from class Landroid/os/AsyncTask. Typically, it is common for an app
to have thousands of entry points.
Moreover, these entry points can be far from targets identified by GAINDroid as
problematic. Collectively, these entry points can originate hundreds of thousands to millions
of paths in each app. Searching through all these paths to find optimal solutions via genetic
algorithm would be highly expensive. To make searching more feasible, we develop an
approach to reduce the number of entry points we must exercise.
Our approach focuses on another type of entry point referred to as public entry points. We
can find these public entry points by analyzing the Android manifest file of each app. Our anal-
ysis looks for “activity” tags. For example, the manifest file of com.Extramarks.Smartstudy
shows the following class as an activity as well as others:
com.Extramarks.Smartstudy.MyProfile.Profile_New_Activity
At the end of this process, we have a file containing all the public classes.
We then analyze the report from GAINDroid and look for any methods that belong to
that class. We hope to find such a method in the middle of a path closer to a specified target.
As an example, we found a path in GAINDroid’s report that includes:
com.Extramarks.Smartstudy.MyProfile.Profile_New_Activity:
void onClick(android.view.View)>
As such, the method onClick represents a public entry point. We refer to this method as a
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public entry point since its class is in the manifest file. Once we identify these public entry
points, we can use the input generator in PREV to directly exercise them. Algorithm 1
describes the process to extract public entry points.
Algorithm 1: Identifying Public Entry Points
Input: file1: public class file, file2: GAINDroid’s report file
Output: PubEP[ ]: an array of public entry points
initialize PubEP [ ], PClass, path, node
for each Pclass in file1 do
for each path in file 2 do
node = path.head
while node.num < path.length do
if node.class == PClass then








Next, we define a sensitive path as a path containing methods (nodes) from a public
entry point to a target node. We developed an algorithm that traverses a method call graph
backward to identify these sensitive paths. The algorithm begins at a specified target and
then ends when the path reaches a public entry point or an entry point. Since we have far
fewer public entry points than entry points, this analysis is efficient. If multiple paths can
lead to a specified target, the algorithm traverses every path to identify the public entry
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point that originates that path. At the end of this process, we have a subset of paths and
public entry points that we need to exercise.
For example, by analyzing a method graph of an application, our proposed algorithm
identifies two paths that can reach a specified target, c. By traversing backward, the algorithm
identifies reversed path 1: c → b → a and reversed path 2: c → f → d. These two paths,
a→ b→ c and d→ f → c, are the sensitive paths to reach c, and the subset of public entry
points that we need to exercise are a and d. Our subsequent dynamic analysis does not need
to instigate other entry points in the app by knowing these two entry points.
Algorithm 2: Identifying Sensitive Paths
Input: file1: public entry point file, file2: GAINDroid’s report file
Output: SensitivePath[ ]: an array of sensitive paths
initialize SensitivePath [ ], PEPoint, path, node, target
for each PEPoint in file1 do
for each target in file 2 do
for each edge in target do
node = target while node.num < node.length do




path = add node.method
node = node.prior
end





Algorithm 2 describes the steps to identify sensitive paths through backward traversal of
a method call graph based on the previously identified public entry points (see Algorithm 1).
Once we have all the sensitive paths, the next step selects paths that our system will likely
generate inputs successfully. We describe the selection process next.
3.3 Test case generation
In this step, our system selects paths that our input generation system is likely to be successful.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, we utilize the input generation system in PREV and Monkey, a
random event sequence generator. PREV improves on input generation via genetic algorithm.
However, it only considers public entry points as part of its input generation; it does not
consider private actions. Thus, it would get stuck when it encounters a private action call.
As such, our selection process considers paths with the following properties:
• Paths that do not contain any private action call and do not invoke any UI events.
• Paths that contain UI events, but these events occur before any private action call.
As an example, our system would select the following paths:
Path1 : E → PU → PU → PU → T
and
Path2 : E → PU → UI → PR→ T
Note that E, PU , PR, UI, and T denote entry point, public method, private method, UI
method, and target, respectively. However, it would not select the following path:
Path3 : E → PU → PR→ UI → T
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This is because the handover from PREV to Monkey occurs at the first UI event.
However, in Path 3, the private action call occurs while PREV is still improving the input.
On the other hand, Path 2 contains a private action call, but this happens after the UI
event. At that point, our approach would use Monkey to generate event sequences, and
Monkey can handle private action calls. Algorithm 3 describes the path selection process.
The algorithm traverses each sensitive path looking for those that satisfy the two previously
mentioned properties.
Algorithm 3: Sensitive Path Selection
Input: file1: path file
Output: filtered path [ ]: an array of paths
initialize filter path [ ], flag
for path i in file1 do
flag = 1
while node n != target node do








if flag == 1 then





At this point, we are ready to execute the selected sensitive paths. Our approach contains
the following steps. First, we choose only the public entry points that begin our selected
sensitive paths. These are the only entry points that we try to exercises since they can
potentially reach our targets. We used Genymotion, an Android emulator, to execute our
apps. However, this process also works on actual devices.
Second, if the paths contain no UI events and private method calls, we only utilize the
PREV’s input generator. However, if the paths contain UI events, we initiate the execution
with PREV’s input generator. At the UI event, our approach automatically switches over to
Monkey to continue the input generation process.
Third, we observe the execution and use the fitness score to indicate the quality of
performance. When execution reaches a specified target, the score is 1. If execution cannot
reach the target, the score is below 1. Execution that gets close to the target would have a
higher score than the one that does not. Next, we empirically evaluated the proposed system




This chapter describes our empirical evaluation to assess the effectiveness of our Sensitive
Path Generation and Selection. We also describe our process to verify the results of GAIN-
Droid [27]. Our goal is to generate test cases that can reach the target APIs flagged by
GAINDroid as vulnerable. In our evaluation, we address the following three Research
Questions (RQs):
RQ1: What is the effectiveness of our analysis to reduce the number of entry points that
we need to exercise?
RQ2: What is the effectiveness of the Sensitive Path Selection Process?
RQ3: Can our proposed approach effectively generate inputs that can verify the results of
GAINDroid?
4.1 Objects of Analysis
While GAINDroid can perform compatibility analysis of many Android API levels (API
8 to 28), our focus is on the dynamic analysis component. As such, we only conducted
our evaluation to identify compatibility issues between apps and API 19. We initially
download 200 apps from APKpure that can support API 19. That is, the developers declared
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# App Name Package Name minSDKVersion targetSDKVersion
1 Extramarks_Smart_Study com.Extramarks.Smartstudy 15 24
2 Eye_Filter_Blue_light_filter com.diaohs.cola 9 24
3 Eye_test com.b2creativedesigns.eyetesty 15 22
4 EyeEm_Camera_Photo_Filter com.baseapp.eyeem 15 23
5 EyeFilter_Bluelight com.lunatouch.eyefilter.free 16 23
6 Eyes_Makeup_Tutorial yamayka.apps.Makeup 11 23
7 EZ_Skins_Case_Simulator com.remi.casesimulator 14 23
8 F8 com.facebook.f8 16 22
9 FAASOS_Order_Food_Online com.done.faasos 16 23
10 Fabby_Promotions com.fabbypromotions 14 23
11 Fabulyst_Personal_Stylist com.fabulyst.mobile 15 23
12 Face_Blemishes_Removal com.appssquare.FaceBlemishesRemove 11 22
13 Face_Changerl com.scoompa.facechanger 15 21
14 Face_Makeup_Hairstyle com.faceemake.up 14 23
15 Facehacker_2016_Prank com.karafita.facehacker 14 23
16 FahrPlaner de.hafas.android.vbn 9 22
17 Fake_Chat_Conversations f.industries.fakemessagesr 17 25
18 Fake_Chat_For_Whatsapp com.fake.chate.forrr.whatsapp 14 23
19 Fake_Conversation_for_Whatsapp com.gokberkyagci.whatsjoker 15 22
20 Fake_ID_Generator app.bugbyte.fakeidgenerator 15 21
21 Fake_Prank_Call_Simulator com.flex.fakecallsimulator 9 23
22 Family_Fun_Pack baby.com.FamilyFunPack 14 24
23 Family_Locator_GPS_Tracker com.zoemob.gpstracking 15 23
24 Family_Zone_Device_Controller au.com.familyzone 10 22
25 Fandanz_a_Dance_Game ar.com.na8.fandanz 10 22
26 Fandom_GTA com.wikia.singlewikia.gta 16 25
27 FanDuel_Daily_Fantasy_Sports com.fanduel.android.self 15 24
28 FanFiction_Net com.fictionpress.fanfiction 15 25
29 Fanspole_Fantasy_Cricket com.fanspole 15 23
30 Fantasy_Backgrounds org.doolatmaldar.fantasybackgrounds 9 19
31 Fantasy_Football_Manager_FPL com.homemade.ffm2 14 25
32 Fantasy_Football com.nfl.fantasy.core.android 16 23
33 Fantasy_Wallpaper_HD com.hd.factory.fantasy.fix 9 23
34 Farmers_Meet_Cow_Girl_Dating com.fitpicapp.farmers_meet 16 22
35 Farming_simulator_15_mods com.zapk.lsmods 14 19
36 Fashion_and_African_clothes com.masociete.Mode_et_Tenues_Africaines 4 19
37 Fashion_nail_art_designs_tuto com.appsdv.com.nailpolshart 9 25
38 Fast_Mp3_Download_Music com.songscharacters.fastmp3downloadmusic 9 19
39 Fast_News t.pinenuts.rassegnastampa 16 23
40 Fast_PSX_Emulator_Free com.psx.psxpsx 8 21
41 Faster_Social_Lite com.sappcorp.litefacebook 9 25
42 FastKey_Launcher io.fastkey.launcher 16 22
43 Fasttrack_Taxi_App com.stpl.fasttrackbooking 15 25
44 FedEx com.fedex.ida.android 14 23
45 Feed_Baby_Baby_Tracker au.com.penguinapps.android.babyfeeding.client.android 15 24
46 FHX_Clash_Of_Clans com.mtechfhx.cocfhx 15 22
Table 4.1: App information.
minSdkVersion and maxSdkVersion to include API 19. Since we downloaded these apps
from a third-party download service, we ensured that these apps are not malicious. We
submitted them to VirusTotal.com for security analysis [33]. The vetting result showed
that they are all benign. Next, we ran all of them on our emulator to ensure that we can
conduct dynamic analysis. We then analyzed the apps that could run on the emulator with
GAINDroid and kept only the ones that have compatibility issues. This elimination process
resulted in a total of 46 apps; Table 4.1 describes them.
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4.2 Independent Variables.
Our independent variables involve the baseline techniques used in our study. We use Monkey,
and PREV’s input generator as the baseline systems. Monkey is a widely used random
event sequence generation tool for Android. A study by Choudhary et al. indicated that it is
still the most effective in delivering high code coverage [8].
PREV is a permission re-delegation detection tool [9]. It has several components, but the
most relevant to our work is the test input generation subsystem that uses a genetic algorithm
to optimize the inputs to reach specified targets (we refer to PREV’s input generation system
as PREV). It generates test cases in the form of intents that can exercise Android software
components. More information about PREV is available in Chapter 2.
We compare the performances of these two baseline systems against that of our proposed
approach, which is a hybrid of PREV’s input generation component and Monkey (we refer
to our proposed system as hybrid).
4.3 Dependent Variables
To answer RQ1 and RQ2, we compute the effectiveness based on the ratio between the
selected entry points that can reach targets and all the entry points in an app. For RQ1, the
effectiveness is calculated by:
1− PublicEntryPointselected
EntryPointtotal
For RQ2, the effectiveness is calculated by:
1− Pathselected
Pathsensitive
Note that the higher value indicates higher effectiveness.
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To answer RQ3, we use the fitness score to indicate if our generated input can reach a
specified target. If it has not, the fitness score also indicates how close it is to the target. We
measure the closeness to the target by observing each execution and how far each goes down
a path. Here is the formula to calculate the fitness score:
FitnessScore =
reached nodes in a given path
the length of a given path
If we reach the target, the fitness score is 1, and we further check the log file. The log
file shows whether or not the app crashed during each dynamic analysis attempt. If the app
crashed, the result is considered a true positive; otherwise, it is a false positive. We terminate
the dynamic analysis of an app after a target is reached. Because the input optimization can
run for a long time, we also set the time limit to 5 hours per app. If our analysis terminates
due to time out and cannot reach any target, we report the verification result as “inconclusive”;
i.e., if given more time, we may or may not reach a target. We also report the total time to
analyze all apps dynamically.
4.4 Study Operation
We set up our evaluation environment on a machine equipped with an Intel Core i7 3.6
GHz processor, 16 GB RAM, running Windows 10. We ran each app on Genymotion, an
Android Emulator. We configured the emulator to run Android API 19 and use 8 GB RAM.
For PREV, we used the same configuration as that used by Demissie and Ceccato. That
is, we set the initial population size to 10 and maximum generations of 30 [9].
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4.5 Threats to Validity
The primary threat to external validity in this study involves the object programs utilized.
In this work, our objects are publicly available programs used by prior research work [4,5].
We also ensure that they all can run on the same API level (version 19 in this case).
The primary threat to internal validity involves potential errors in the implementation of
our measurement process. To limit these, we extensively validated all of our measurement
components and scripts to ensure correctness.
The primary threat to construct validity relates to the fact that we study efficiency
measures relative to our proposed hybrid input generation approach. However, we do not
assess whether it can help software engineers or security analysts address dependability and





This chapter reports the results of our empirical evaluation.
5.1 RQ1: Effectiveness of Entry Point Reduction
As previously mentioned, one effective way to improve the efficiency of genetic algorithm is
to reduce the search space. Our Algorithm 2 achieves this goal without reducing the search
effectiveness. By identifying entry points that can reach targets, we eliminate the need to
exercise entry points and exploring paths that can never reach those targets. Table 5.1 reports
the reduction effectiveness.
In 43 out of 46 apps, we are able to reduce the numbers of entry points that our approach
needs to generate inputs. As shown, in Table 5.1, the numbers of entry points range from
2,935 to 12,919. By applying our analysis to identify public entry points that can reach our
targets, we have between 1 and 216 public entry points. Our reductions range from 96.91%
to 99.99%. In terms of paths, each app can have more than 100,000 paths. By using public
entry points instead of entry points, the number of paths can be as small as 5,000 paths.
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 (gray bars) report the number of paths remaining after the reduction
for each app. Note that no app exceeds 69,000 paths.
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App ID # of Entry Points Reduction (%) App ID # of Entry Points Reduction (%)
Total Alg. 2 Alg. 3 Alg. 2 Alg. 3 Total Alg. 2 Alg. 3 Alg. 2 Alg. 3
1 7759 133 15 98.29 88.72 24 8707 70 29 99.19 58.57
2 3036 22 22 99.27 0.00 25 5507 208 37 99.20 82.21
3 7752 116 12 98.50 89.66 26 11305 20 13 99.82 35.00
4 12260 60 10 99.51 83.33 27 11382 154 20 98.65 87.01
5 2935 96 24 96.73 75.00 28 5041 156 62 96.91 60.26
6 3668 12 2 99.67 83.33 29 8180 53 3 99.35 94.34
7 5872 43 10 99.27 76.74 30 5842 105 0 98.19 100.00
8 8001 5 5 99.93 0.00 31 5043 75 13 98.51 82.67
9 8590 161 15 98.13 90.68 32 9521 48 1 99.50 97.92
10 11491 13 7 99.89 46.15 33 8965 57 7 99.36 87.92
11 4403 75 3 98.30 96.00 34 7613 83 8 98.91 90.36
12 12919 204 37 98.42 81.86 35 8047 13 6 99.83 53.85
13 9106 136 99 98.51 27.21 36 9136 42 0 99.54 100.00
14 11423 1 1 99.99 0.00 37 5838 1 0 99.98 100.00
15 10837 34 11 99.68 67.65 38 11973 31 6 99.74 80.65
16 7307 12 4 99.84 66.67 39 11973 12 3 99.89 75.00
17 4958 58 4 98.83 93.10 40 11970 124 9 98.96 92.74
18 9983 9 6 99.91 33.33 41 6839 32 23 99.53 28.13
19 2940 26 25 99.12 3.85 42 3508 101 96 97.12 4.95
20 5021 11 3 99.78 72.73 43 5357 20 13 99.62 35.00
21 5021 10 3 99.80 70.00 44 10435 192 10 98.16 94.79
22 5754 18 18 99.68 0.00 45 11638 71 8 99.28 88.73
23 9678 216 70 97.76 67.59 46 5101 57 36 98.88 36.84
Table 5.1: Entry Points after Applying Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3.
Figure 5.1: Number of Paths
5.2 RQ2: Effectiveness of Sensitive Path Reduction
Because PREV does not consider private action calls, inputs for paths containing such calls
would not evolve. Thus, there is an opportunity to save exploration time by eliminating paths
that contains those private action calls. Our Algorithm 3 performs this path selection to
eliminate any path that PREV would encounter private method calls. Note that Algorithm3
allows private method calls that would be exercised by Monkey.
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App ID # of Paths Reduction App ID # of Paths Reduction
(Algorithm 2) (Algorithm 3) (%) (Algorithm 2) (Algorithm 3) (%)
1 59004 15347 73.99 24 57047 6446 88.70
2 36036 148 99.59 25 5005 232 95.36
3 30026 4843 83.87 26 57059 6715 88.23
4 63104 9906 84.30 27 60042 5279 91.21
5 38026 2948 92.25 28 55031 11786 78.58
6 20018 1449 92.76 29 47046 1167 97.52
7 31026 2076 93.31 30 2239 0 100.00
8 39038 2066 94.71 31 63042 10121 83.95
9 46039 6915 84.98 32 59045 725 98.77
10 30023 2526 91.59 33 59046 6007 89.83
11 68055 6657 90.22 34 32022 1683 94.74
12 37016 4902 86.76 35 4999 246 95.08
13 47046 6299 86.61 36 10005 0 100.00
14 48033 611 98.73 37 6001 0 100.00
15 30023 1644 94.52 38 19016 605 96.82
16 23024 1994 91.34 39 20013 588 97.06
17 67314 5179 92.31 40 22016 655 97.02
18 17383 1471 91.54 41 39037 1773 95.46
19 30016 3121 89.60 42 44038 25517 42.06
20 13048 437 96.65 43 68046 5129 92.46
21 13047 437 96.64 44 57046 4278 92.50
22 41976 318 99.24 45 58058 22474 61.29
23 57041 908 98.41 46 14019 3690 73.68
Table 5.2: Path Reduction after Applying Algorithm 3
.
As shown in Table 5.1, we are able to further reduce the number of public entry points
for each app using this selection process. The reduction in the number of public entry points
range from 0% to 100%. Note that 100% reduction means that there are no public entry
points that our approach can exercise. The average public entry point reduction is 64.79%.
The smallest and the largest numbers of entry points are 1 and 216, respectively.
In terms of paths, Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 (black bars) report the number of paths
remaining after applying the sensitive path selection. Note that no app exceeds 26,000 paths.
In terms of path reduction percentages, Table 5.2 reports the result. Applying Algorithm 3
reduces the number of paths by 90.31% on average. The maximum reduction is 100% or zero
paths remaining (apps 30, 36, and 37), implying that our approach would not be able to
work on these apps. The lowest reduction is 42.06% (app 42).
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5.3 RQ3: Effectiveness of Generated Inputs to Reach Targets
To answer RQ3, we need to observe two factors. The first factor is the effectiveness of
generated inputs to reach targets identified by GAINDroid. The second factor is the
validation of GAINDroid results based on the targets that have been reached. That is, do
the apps crash when we invoke those targets? If they do, these are true positives. If they do
not, they are false positives. For those targets that we cannot reach, they are inconclusive.
For comparison, we use Monkey, PREV, and our proposed hybrid approach to exercise
these apps. For Monkey, the event-sequence generation is random and aims to invoke as
many UI events. As such, we did not apply entry point reduction and sensitive path selection
processes. For PREV, we provided a list of entry points from analyzing the resource files
and applying Algorithms 2. The list provides PREV with public entry points that can reach
targets. For our hybrid approach, we applied the entry point reduction and sensitive path
selection processes.
Figure 5.2 reports the results of using Monkey to generate event sequences to reach
the targets. Monkey was able to reach targets in four apps. It also came close to reaching
specified targets (more than 0.95 fitness scores) in five other apps. This confirms the
observation reported by Choudhary et al. [8] that Monkey is effective. It also produced low
fitness scores (below 0.30) for eight apps. However, it could not exercise 13 apps due to the
lack of UI interfaces or its event sequences caused the apps to crash right away.
Figure 5.3 reports the results of using PREV to generate intents to reach the targets.
PREV was not able to reach any targets within the given 5 hours. Its high fitness scores
range from 0.7 to 0.85; there are eight apps in this range. It also produced 22 fitness scores
below 0.30. However, it was successful in exercising all apps. This shows that it is more
applicable than Monkey.
Figure 5.3 reports the results of using the hybrid approach to generate intents and event
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Figure 5.2: Monkey Result
Figure 5.3: PREV Result
sequences to reach the targets. Note that we experimented with using the hybrid approach
on the public entry points and paths after we applied Algorithm 2, which is shown in gray
bars, and after we applied both algorithms, which is shown in black bars. We evaluated both
data sets because we would like to assess the effect of the proposed sensitive path selection.
We observed that applying Algorithms 2 and 3 caused three apps to have no paths left (apps
30, 36, and 37). Further inspection revealed that these apps invoke private actions, which is
not supported by PREV. As a sanity check, we ran these three apps using the public entry
points obtained from applying Algorithm 2 and expected these apps to yield very low fitness
scores as PREV would not be able to finish.
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Figure 5.4: Hybrid Result (PREV and Monkey)
In addition, since the genetic algorithm is a heuristic search approach based on a random
population, there is randomness in each run that can result in different path explorations. We
hoped that running both data sets may reveal additional apps that we could reach targets.
When we consider entry points from applying only Algorithm 2 (gray bars), our hybrid
approach can reach targets in 6 apps, two more apps than using Monkey alone. The rest
are inconclusive. Four of the apps are the same as those reached by Monkey (apps 5, 13,
15, and 33). The two additional apps are 42 and 46. However, when we applied our approach
to the entry points after applying both algorithms (black bars), it can reach targets in nine
apps; four are the same as those reached by Monkey. The five additional apps are 2, 14, 28,
31, and 35. The hybrid approach, in total, can reach targets in 11 apps; or seven more apps
than when we only used Monkey.
Lastly, we consider whether our hybrid system is effective in revealing faults identified by
GAINDroid. Since our hybrid approach can reach 11 apps in total, we observed if invoking
the reported targets caused the apps to crash. Table 5.3 reports the result of our investigation.
We only include the 11 apps that we could reach the targets.
Note that each 3 indicates that the corresponding approach reached a target, causing
the system to crash. Thus, the X also indicates true positive. Each 7 indicates that the
corresponding approach reached a target but did not crash the app. Thus, the 7 also indicates
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a false positive. Each blank cell indicates that the corresponding approach did not reach any
target.
App ID Monkey Hybrid–Algorithm 2 Hybrid–Algorithm 3
2   3
5 7 7 7
13 3 3 3
14   7
15 7 7 7
28   3
31   3
33 3 3 3
35   3
42  3  
46  3  
Table 5.3: TP/FP Table
By using Monkey alone, we are able to verify that two out of the four targets reached
are false positives. The hybrid approach using only entry points from applying Algorithm 2
reveals to additional true positive targets (apps 42 and 46). The hybrid approach using public
entry points from applying Algorithms 2 and 3 reveals four more true positives (apps 2, 28,
31, and 35). A new target reached by this approach turns out to be a false positive (app 14).





Static analysis can provide a quick way to detect dependability and vulnerability issues.
However, static analysis results often contain many false alarms that can cause software
engineers to doubt the validity of such analysis results. As such, researchers and practitioners
often use dynamic analysis to validate the static analysis results.
In Android, a significant challenge to perform the dynamic analysis is to generate mean-
ingful inputs to expose reported issues. Such inputs must instigate execution that can reach
specific code locations. Recent studies have shown that random event sequence generation is
still an excellent approach to exercise UI events, and meta-heuristic search techniques such as
a genetic algorithm can generate good inputs to exercise services and components. However,
our study also shows that each technique is not effective at generating inputs that can reach
specific targets in real-world Android apps. This thesis introduces an approach that combines
these two techniques to reach more targets than each technique can achieve alone.
Our approach combines static analysis, dynamic analysis, genetic algorithm-based, and
random test generation techniques. Our process generated test cases that explore the API
that caused incompatibility issues based on GAINDroid. We conducted our experience
on 46 real-world apps from the third-party website, APK pure, and all apps are benign, as
analyzed by VirusTotal. Our approach automatically generates inputs that reach specified
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targets in 11 apps, while Monkey was able to reach targets in four apps, and PREV was
not able to reach any target.
6.1 Future Work
While we tried to reduce the cost of heuristic search by reducing the number of entry points
and sensitive paths, the proposed input generation process is still expensive. We would like
to fine-tune the genetic algorithm parameters in future work, including the population size,
the maximum generations, and the timeout interval, to explore more paths. We currently set
the timeout to 5 hours per attempt, and we early terminate as soon as a target is reached.
As such, we have several GAINDroid’s results that we could not conclusively state whether
they are true positives or false positives.
Furthermore, by early terminating, we evaluated the accuracy of GAINDroid’s reported
result per app. While this approach can provide an early indication of problematic apps,
given more time, we should conduct this evaluation per target. Per-target verification can
play a valuable role in supporting testing and repairing platform incompatibility issues. We
will continue to expand our evaluation process to achieve this goal.
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